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In Critical Theory of Communication, Christian Fuchs explores how the theories of five key thinkers
from the Frankfurt School – Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Axel Honneth and Ju ̈rgen Habermas
– can contribute to a critical understanding of contemporary media. While the book succeeds in
underscoring the need to continue re-examining the vital contributions of these theorists, it does not always fully
convince of their relevance to more specific aspects of the digital age, argues Adam Hodgkin. 
Critical Theory of Communication: New Readings of Lukacs, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in
the Age of the Internet. Christian Fuchs. University of Westminster Press. 2016.
Find this book: 
In Critical Theory of Communication , Christian Fuchs
reviews and analyses the cultural, communication and
media theories of Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, Herbert
Marcuse, Axel Honneth, Jürgen Habermas and some lesser
figures from the Frankfurt School. He also gives attention to
other broadly sympathetic thinkers who are not normally
regarded as belonging to this strand of Marxist thought: for
example, Raymond Williams, Gaston Baudrillard and Lev
Vygotsky. Fuchs’s aim is to introduce these scholars to
demonstrate that their theoretical positions have current
applicability to contemporary understandings of the internet,
digital culture and, most particularly, social media.
The two most important theoretical poles in Fuchs’s
exposition are Lukács and Marcuse, and behind them the
foundational thinkers for the critical theory approach, Karl
Marx and Hegel, with Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin
Heidegger lurking off-stage. There is a clear challenge for
Fuchs’s project: none of these thinkers could in any way
have understood the ways in which digital technology would
become such a transformative and globalised condition of
contemporary society. Even Habermas, who has given a
central role to communication, the public sphere and rational
action in an information world, published his most important
works before the web was invented, long before we
discovered trolling, cyber-bullying, ‘liking’ and phishing. So
one immediate challenge for Fuchs’s approach is the need
for a strong effort of interpretive imagination if we are to refocus Lukács’s convoluted Hegelian apparatus on the
current manifestations of popular culture.
Fuchs is particularly keen to draw the reader’s attention to Lukács’s last work, a magnum opus entitled Ontology of
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Social Being (1978), running to 1400 pages in the German edition. Only a third has so far been translated into
English, and it seems to have had little impact in social theory or even Marxist-materialist philosophy. Indeed, the
seminal Lukács work to which Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer and others were reacting is the much earlier History
and Class Consciousness (1923). Fuchs cites as evidence of neglect the astonishing imbalance in citations of these
two works, as shown by Google Scholar: over 5,000 citations of the latter against fewer than twenty of the
‘unfortunately neglected’ Ontology.
Yet, for Fuchs, this last book was a late flowering and is of key relevance to Marxist cultural theory. This claim relies
in part on the key role that Lukács gives to labour and the use of tools in the evolution and development of social
systems and an ‘ontology’ which is not natural, merely physical or strictly biological. Lukacs writes, or is translated, in
a heavy Hegelian manner, but Fuchs makes the case that this is a book to be considered and read seriously.
However the main themes in Ontology — labour, tools, language and the evolution of consciousness and of the
social —  appear to have at least as much relevance to aspects of contemporary digital culture and economy not
touched upon in Fuchs’s primarily (social) media orientation, including themes such as globalisation, automation,
virtualisation and robotics.
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Fuchs also convinces in showing that we should look more closely at Marcuse’s critiques of commercial culture. The
Frankfurt School is not dead — these thinkers do merit further reading, and Lukács and Marcuse look the pick of the
bunch. For these reasons, Fuchs’s book earns its subtitle: New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and
Habermas in the Age of the Internet. We should read these thinkers because they articulated fundamental political,
ideological and, at their base, moral critiques of capitalism and twentieth-century culture. As we continue through
this era of digital culture, largely but not entirely profit-driven, we need to look at some of these long-standing planes
of critique. However, while some of the problems they identified have deepened, they were all writing well before the
development of new digital, and profoundly different, forms of mass culture. Where Fuchs is less successful is in
demonstrating how their theoretical frameworks can, or even could, have relevance to the specific features of this.
For example, Fuchs develops a Lukács-inspired dialectical model of cultural work through which users of digital
platforms are also workers exploited as generators of advertising commodities:
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The international division of labour involves Congolese slave workers who mine minerals that form
the physical foundation of mobile phones, computers and laptops. Assemblage workers, such as the
highly exploited Foxconn workers in China, assemble the ICT components […] into whole
technologies.
These are put to use by other workers: low-paid software engineers in countries such as China and India as well as
highly paid programmers at Google, Microsoft and other large companies. Finally:
Consumers put to use both hardware and software for various purposes. On advertising-driven
Internet platforms, these users are also workers, whose usage labour creates a data commodity that
advertisement-driven platforms such as Facebook, Weibo, Twitter or YouTube sell as commodities to
their clients (62).
This is not a helpful model for the economic framework of contemporary digital culture: it is essentially descriptive
with some revolutionary ‘colour’ added to the interlocking account of global logistics and chains of added value.
When our economic model or our topology of social relations becomes so all-embracing that any social act is ‘work’,
the explanatory power of the categories of ‘labour’, ‘profit’ and ‘value’ lose their grip. Note that a similar mutually
interdependent, exploitative, multinational model could be constructed for the airline industry (with tourists doing
aeronautical work as they fly to holiday destinations) or the pharmaceutical industry (with patients in a ‘precarious’
way doing medical labour by consuming medicines or submitting to randomised control trials).
Fuchs makes a similar mistake in sketching the ways in which the celebrity culture of Twitter and Facebook gives
rise to a ‘repressive tolerance’ of false connectivity and the mere appearance of democracy and equality that is, in
fact, serving a ‘Facebook capitalism’. ‘Repressive tolerance’ is a valid concept and may be a useful way of
approaching the hot topics of ‘fake news’ and ‘consumer bubbles’, but these clear negatives are only part of the
story. A critical theory should provide a nuanced picture of the ways these new institutions appear to breed their own
‘issues’ from their digital character: they invent vices as a by-product of their virtues. Fuchs’s notion of ‘Facebook
capitalism’ is also worth some attention; but it is too easy to suppose we have understood what is problematic about
these businesses when we note that they rely on a capitalist and consumer-driven advertising engine. We would
have more confidence in a critical theory of digital culture if it could give evidence for the compelling and innovative
ways in which these institutions formed. Facebook, Twitter and now Snapchat acquired or assumed advertising
technologies, but they did not start that way, and at base they are not experienced or chosen by their users for this
advertising potential. A critical theory would explain why the forms of social practice we find in these spaces have
nonetheless become so sticky and compelling.
Fuchs has given us a useful and helpful survey of some of the key thinkers from the Frankfurt School. His guidance
will be particularly useful to those of us who need a reminder of the Hegelian, Marxist context in which much of this
critical theory was grounded. The most surprising omission from the range of thinkers is Walter Benjamin, whom
many would see as having been the most significant cultural and literary theorist in the School, and one who has
significance to digital culture. The absence of Benjamin is so glaring that it is a mistake not to have provided some
justification for it: his inclusion might have helped to give cutting edge to the book’s aim of developing a new critical
theory of digital culture.
Adam Hodgkin is the chairman of London-based Exact Editions. He was previously philosophy editor, then
electronic publisher at Oxford University Press, before founding or co-founding Cherwell Scientific Publishing, xrefer
and Exact Editions. He has recently published Following Searle on Twitter: How Words Create Digital Institutions
(Chicago UP, 2017) and he tweets as @adamhodgkin.
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Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the
London School of Economics. 
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